Abstract-Authenticating whether two smartphones are in close proximity is important in smartphone security. For example, the authentication result can be used to pair two devices and construct a secure communication channel between them. Many existing proximity authentication systems rely on short range networks-the communication is usually restricted in short range networks. However, this approach is inadequate when we want to verify whether the communication distance is within a few centimeters, i.e. near field. To address this challenge, many other techniques construct systems based on the near field communication (NFC) system. Unfortunately, only a small portion of smart devices in the current market are equipped with NFC chips. The purpose of this paper is to provide a close proximity authentication system which does not depend on NFC chips. We devise a system to achieve close proximity authentication by using correlated finger movements on the two smartphones. Human input usually contains errors and is of low entropy, which affects the usability and security of our system. We solve these issues in an efficient way, considering the limited computational resources on smart devices. Our system does not need any prior secret information shared between the two devices, and generates the same high-entropy cryptographic key for both devices in a successful authentication. The efficiency of the system is validated by evaluations on Motorola Droid smartphones.
INTRODUCTION
T HIS work is motivated by a common scenario of using smart devices, such as smartphones or tablets. Two people, say Alice and Bob, carry their smart devices and meet each other in a cafeteria. Alice is going to transfer some of their photos to Bob via the free public WiFi provided by the cafeteria. However, they want to do the transmission confidentially because the photos are private to them. Over the insecure public WiFi, Alice and Bob need to set up a one-time cryptographic session key to protect their communications, i.e. the photo transmission. In order to agree on a one-time session key, they should first invoke some key exchange (KE) protocol, such as Diffie-Hellman KE protocol. Since Alice and Bob are meeting in person, they can carry out a proximity authentication before executing the KE protocol to defend against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. For example, the proximity authentication can be based on a near field communication (NFC) system. An NFC system can only work within a distance less than a few centimeters. An MITM attacker is difficult to attack the communication carried out by an NFC system. However, current NFC systems rely on NFC chips, which are not available on many smart devices. In fact, only 20 percent of the smartphones on the market are expected to be equipped with an NFC chip by the end of 2014 [2] .
The goal of this work is to design a system that works on off-the-shelf smartphones and is able to authenticate whether two devices are in the near field. We call this kind of proximity authentication near field proximity authentication (NFPA). In addition to authenticating devices, NFPA has other applications. One usage is to use the authentication result as an assertion and attach it to any sensitive interdevice transaction as a geographic witness. Most proximity authentication systems rely on short range networks, such as bluetooth, and do not satisfy near field requirement. In some critical security cases, these systems cannot provide appropriate authentication. For example, a mobile payment system may require that the proximity authentication succeeds only if the smartphone and the cashier's POS terminal stay in the near field. The communication range of Bluetooth is between 1 meter and 100 meters [3] and cannot provide sufficient granularity. Recall that function of an NFPA system is to ensure that the two smartphones are in the near field when the authentication succeeds.
With the widespread usage of smart devices, we will see an increasing number of demands for NFPA. As mentioned above, mobile payment is one example. Another example is to establish a one-time usage secure channel for two smartphones. Secure file transmission between two devices is one such example. The physical close proximity ensured by NFPA provides another layer of security assurance to these application scenarios. It is because the physical proximity implies that the application progress is under smartphone owner's supervision. We believe that more and more applications will benefit from NFPA. Constructing NFPA system on top of NFC is a natural choice. However, as mentioned previously, NFC system is not available on many smartphones. Therefore, it is necessary to construct an NFPA system compatible for smart devices without NFC chips.
The basic idea of a near field proximity authentication is to compel two smart devices to appear together and stay close when the authentication is carried out. Many previous works [4] , [5] , [6] provided initial solutions to this problem. BUMP [4] is a representative system among these works. The purpose of BUMP is to provide a fast way to match two smartphones and then set up a secure data transmission channel. Their construction, according to [6] , is to first bump the two smartphones, then use the accelerometer in each smartphone to sense the force of the bump, and send the sensed results to a trusted server. The server compares every incoming data, matches the two smartphones, produces and sends the same session key to both if a match is found. However, using a centralized trusted center may not be suitable for our scenario, due to the single-point-of-failure and the fact that Internet access may not always be available. For example, some tablets do not have cellular data services and cannot have access to the Internet in places that do not provide public Internet connections. Therefore, it is preferable to perform NFPA over local networks, such as bluetooth or wireless LAN. Mayrhofer and Gellersen [5] proposed two authentication protocols with the purpose of pairing two devices. They used the accelerometer data that is sensed during the shake motion to create a session key for the smart devices. In order to shake the devices, the device user needs to hold the two devices tightly in one hand. This limits their protocol application to the small-sized mobile devices. Large or fixed devices, such as tablets or self-service check-in machines, cannot use their construction.
The idea of our near field proximity authentication system is inspired by the observation that touch screens are now widely equipped by smart devices. Therefore, we propose to use people's on-screen finger movements to construct a near field proximity authentication system. In order to force two smart devices to stay close to each other, we let a person move two fingers of one hand-usually the index finger and the middle finger-simultaneously on the two smart device screens, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The reason we use this motion is that it is easy and natural to perform and it produces sufficient variations in terms of the sensed data. The more variations the data has, the more difficult it is for an attacker to carry out a dictionary attack. Since the two finger movements are done by one hand, they are highly coherent to each other. We leverage this coherence to generate the session key for the two smart devices.
It is natural to assume that the zigzag on-screen finger movements cannot produce enough variations to fully defend against dictionary attacks. In other words, a particular person's finger movements may follow some pattern that can be used by an attacker to construct a dictionary to enhance the probability of successfully guessing the final session key. When data does not contain many variations, we say it is of low entropy. The low entropy of finger movement data gives rise to the first challenge in our system design. The second challenge is to find out which feature is suitable for finger movements so that the extracted data is robust to the small differences between two finger movements. Finally, even when the feature is robust, it is usually impossible to get two extracted data that are exactly the same. Therefore, a reconciliation approach between the two smart devices is needed to make them agree on the same data.
We make the following contributions in this paper.
We propose to use zigzag on-screen finger movements to perform near field proximity authentication between two smart devices. Most operations of current smartphone operating systems are based on finger movement, which makes it easier for users to learn how to use our system. In our experiments, most users can understand and start to use our system after a 5-minute brief introduction. Another advantage is that finger movements are small and hard-to-catch motions. The movements are hard to be observed and emulated by a nearby attacker, which is a possible attack to the bump system [6] . We design a robust feature so that the two extracted feature data sets are similar to each other. Zigzagging finger movements provide many features, such as curvature, curvature distance, moving time, etc. We propose to use the time between the starting point and a peak point as the feature to be extracted in our system. The reason behind this choice is that a person's finger usually moves slowly, or makes a shorttime pause, when it turns at a curve peak point. Although the time is too short to be noticed by human eyes, it is long enough to be sensed by the touch screens. This makes the elapsed time of two corresponding peak points very similar to each other. Our system takes low entropy error-prone human finger movements as inputs and generates a high entropy cryptographic key. We design an efficient approach using a private set intersection protocol [7] , [8] , [9] to reconciliate the two feature data sets. We use the encrypted key exchange technique to defend against dictionary attacks and generate a high-entropy key. The proposed system is for smartphones and works with limited computation resources. The lightweight computation overhead of our system is demonstrated on Motorola Droid smartphones, which have low-end configuration and have very limited computation capability. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce related works in Section 2. We formulate the NFPA problem and discuss the design goals in Section 3. We present the design and constructions in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We analyze the system in Section 6 and present the experiment results in Section 7. We conclude our work in Section 8. Proximity authentication authenticates whether two devices are in geographic proximity. However, the range of a proximity authentication can be as large as tens of meters. NFPA constricts this range to several centimeters, i.e. near field. In other words, when an NFPA is passed, the two devices should be less than a few centimeters apart.
Proximity authentication usually needs an out-of-band (OOB) channel to transmit secrets and conduct the authentication based on the secrets. Based on the types of OOB channel, existing proximity authentication systems can be divided to two types. One type is to actively transmit secrets via equipments, either build-in equipments, e.g. cameras, or external equipments, e.g. data cables. The other type is to passively sense the secret from the same data source and build trust based on the correlation of the two sensed secrets. The data source could be ambient environment, such as sound [10] , or human motions, such as hand shaking. Our system belongs to the second type.
Stajano and Anderson [11] proposed to use a wired connection to complete the authentication between two devices. Motivated by this work, Balfanz et al. [12] proposed the concept of location-limited channel, over which users carry out the authentication process. The transmission range of the channel in their work could be from centimeters to meters. In contrast, our paper focuses on restricting authentication range in the scale of several centimeters. In addition, the authors of [12] used infrared as their location-limited channel, which is not available on many smart devices. The work of McCune et al. [13] and the follow up work of Saxena and Watt [14] used the smartphone's camera to scan the barcode displayed on the other screen or film a blinking light toward the other. Their protocols are directional, so a user has to execute the protocols twice to achieve mutual authentication, which can be done by our system in one execution. Claycomb and Shin [15] proposed to use audio channel to do proximity authentication. They provided the key verification information through an audio channel and established a secure channel between two smartphones. Their approach can achieve mutual authentication via a single audio message and does not need human assistance.
Many other prior works used various sensors on smartphones to perform proximity authentication. The commercial app BUMP [4] uses the accelerometer to quickly match two smartphones for data transmission. Although originally designed to quickly match two devices, the idea of BUMP can be applied in proximity authentication. It compares the data measured during a bump between two intended devices to match the two devices and provide confidential communications. Their system security and efficiency rely on a trusted center server. However, the server itself may suffer from single-point-of-failure problem [16] . For our scenario, the trusted center scheme is not a suitable choice either, because Internet access is not always available when two people want to perform authentication on their smart devices. In the meantime, it is difficult to derive the same session key from one bump hit due to high oscillation in the measured data of accelerometer. Some works [5] , [6] , [17] , [18] proposed to use the accelerometer data captured during the period of time when a person is shaking two smartphones.
Mayrhofer and Gellersen [5] used a signal processing approach to remove the differences between sensed data sets in order to generate a shared session key. The protocols in [5] do not need a trusted center. The problem of shake based approaches is that it is difficult to hold and shake a big device. Some other works proposed to use vibrations to transmit secret [14] , [19] . The authors used the vibration that is produced by one device to encode the secret and the accelerometer of the other to sense and decode the secret. Recently, Studer et al. [6] proposed an MITM attack against those motion based approaches. They assumed that there is a powerful adversary who can observe the user's motion, such as shake or bump, so that he can emulate a similar motion pattern to carry out an MITM attack. While the success rate of their attack was sensitive to the delay induced by the attacker, their work suggests that a slighter movement is preferred than shake and bump when a third person is standing nearby. Finger movement is such a slight movement that is easily hidden from observations of strangers.
In order to defend against MITM attacks, some prior studies suggested to use human comparison after the secret exchange, because an attacker cannot change the output on the device screen. Many works studied the comparison of a string or hexadecimal digits [20] , [21] , [22] . To improve the usability, other works proposed to encode hexadecimal digits into a sentence [23] or an image [24] . Compared with these works, our system does not need any manual comparison.
Establishing secure channels between two mobile devices without any pre-shared secret information has been recognized as "secure first connect" [25] and has been studied recently. Chong et al. presented the first comprehensive survey [26] on pairing or associating two mobile devices. The paper introduced approaches based on various signals, including geographic proximity, physical contact, visual alignment, etc. In [27] , Suomalainen et al. surveyed several standard protocols to connect new devices to a personal network. They compared Bluetooth Simple Paring, WiFi Protected Setup, Wireless USB Association Models, and HomePlugAV security models. Kumar et al. presented another survey paper [25] focusing on secure device pairing. They implemented the surveyed pairing approaches on the same platform to conduct a comprehensive and comparative field study. Malkani and Dhonemeja [28] also presented a comprehensive survey on existing secure paring approaches and pointed out quite a few interesting research topics. Usually, a "secure first connect" system needs an out-of-band channel to transmit secret information. While some applications seek to migrate or remove such an OOB channel, by using BAN logic, Claycomb and Shin [29] have shown that device authentication using a single channel is impossible.
The novelty of our work is to utilize the touch screen on a smartphone and user's finger movement in the proximity authentication. While finger movements have been used in identity authentication [30] , few literatures focus on proximity authentication and secure channel establishment. Using human gesture across multiple device displays has been studied by [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] . As a type of human input, finger movement usually cannot keep consistent across multiple movements. Therefore, it is challenging to compare two co-related finger movements. Another novelty of this work is to develop an efficient and secure approach to remove the difference between the two finger movements. Many existing proximity authentication systems only output a bit indicating whether the two devices are in the proximity or not. In contrast, our construction outputs two keys separately to the two devices. The two keys are identical if the authentication succeeds and irrelevantly different otherwise. This is important to applications which need not only proximity verification but also a secure communication channel established when the authentication succeeds.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the near field proximity authentication problem.
System Model
A near field proximity authentication system is a mutual proximity authentication system between two parties. When the authentication is successfully passed, the system convinces both parties that they are separated in a distance less than a few centimeters. In addition, at the end of a successful authentication, an NFPA system assigns the same cryptographic session key to both parties. The parties considered in this work are smart devices such as smartphones equipped with touch screens. For convenience, we use Alice and Bob (two human names) to denote the two parties, which are actually two devices.
An NFPA system usually needs an approach to achieve location enforcement, forcing two devices to stay close. Some systems use the physical limit of special communication channels, such as NFC channels. Many other systems ask a person, called conductor in this paper, to achieve the enforcement. The conductor is one of the device owners and is assumed to be trusted in this paper. This is a reasonable assumption because two people willing to do confidential communications must trust each other. BUMP system [4] lets a conductor use one smartphone to hit the other one to ensure that the two devices are both overseen by the conductor. Our construction asks the conductor to slide two fingers of one hand over the two screens to achieve location enforcement.
Attack Model
The two smart devices involved in the authentication, including their executing applications, are considered trusted and not compromised. A near field proximity authentication usually takes place in the presence of device owners. Safeguarding a smart device against being compromised by an outside attacker has been well studied in the area of intrusion detection and is out of the scope of this work.
In this paper, we consider a fully malicious adversary, who controls public communication channels. The adversary is able to eavesdrop any communication. He is also able to tamper, delay, replay, inject and block any message. During a protocol execution, the adversary can carry out an MITM attack, impersonating one party to communicate with the other honest one. Such a powerful adversary is always able to destroy an ongoing authentication process by blocking all messages. However, such a rash attack exposes the presence of the adversary and does not bring back much benefit to the adversary. Observing the presence of an adversary in NFPA, the device owners can stop further communications and move to a more secure place. The main purpose of an NFPA system is to protect follow up communications, which are of more interest to the adversary. Therefore, the purpose of the adversary in this work is to obtain the session key generated by an NFPA system without being captured, so that he can decrypt and obtain the succeeding communication messages.
Design Goals
In addition to defending against the adversary modeled in Section 3.2, we expect an NFPA system to achieve the following design goals.
-It is intuitive to use. A system should be intuitive and easy to use. -It does not rely on prior knowledge. Near field proximity authentication and follow up communications usually take place impromptu. Hence, the two involved parties cannot be assumed to share any prior information. -It is decentralized. An NFPA is expected not to rely on any trusted center, which suffers from a singlepoint-of-failure problem. -It is localized. An NFPA system should still work when the Internet is not accessible. For example, some companies limit the Internet access for safety reasons. In such cases, an NFPA system should make use of local networks, such as bluetooth or WLAN. This goal makes the centralized architecture unsuitable for an NFPA system.
DESIGN OF AN NFPA SYSTEM
4.1 System Overview Fig. 2 shows the architecture of our NFPA system. Our system uses human finger movement on touch screens to assist authentication, taking advantage of the physical closeness of two fingers to enforce the spatial closeness in NFPA. Constructing a proximity authentication based on finger movement has the following advantages.
-The two finger movements are correlated to each other, resulting in the fact that the two captured data sets have many counter parts of small difference. In our later analysis and evaluation, we will show that the difference is as small as three units. We say this two data sets similar. This similarity makes our proximity authentication succeed with high probability.
We will discuss and demonstrate this in Sections 6 and 7. -Most existing smartphone operating systems are operated by finger movement. Therefore, finger movement based system is easy to be adopted by smartphone users. -It is hard to be observed and copied by a nearby attacker. Currently studied motion patterns, such as bumps and shakes, require a quite noticeable motion, which can be captured by a nearby attacker. Exposing these motions to an attacker makes the system vulnerable to a dictionary attack, which has been described in [6] . In our system, when a conductor triggers an authentication process, the two devices sense finger movements on their individual touch screens and extract the feature data locally. Using the extracted data, the two devices interact with each other to generate the same session key. Finally, the two devices verify that the generated session keys are identical before they use them to protect succeeding communications.
Feature Design
Our system asks a conductor to use two fingers from the same hand, to do a "zigzag" movement on two touch screens (see Fig. 1 ). A zigzag movement forms a series of curves, which provide many features to be extracted. The features of a curve have been studied by Zheng et al. in [36] for mouse movement. They recommended to use angle of curvature, curvature distance, and moving direction to characterize a curve movement. However, we found, by experiments, that these spatial features are sensitive to finger movements. A small deviation of two finger movements may cause a big difference between the resulting feature values.
We propose to use a new temporal feature-the time between a peak point and the starting point, i.e., the peak point's elapsed time. As shown in Fig. 1 , the starting point is the point where a finger first touches the screen and peak points are the points where the finger moving direction changes drastically. The robustness of this feature is due to the fact that people usually make a pause when their fingers turn on the screen. Although the pause usually takes only about 0.04 second, it is long enough to be captured by a touch screen and can be easily detected during a follow up data processing. Another observation is that two fingers may slide at slightly different speeds on two screens but they usually turn at the same time. This makes peak point's elapsed time a robust feature for an NFPA system. A time value collected by touch screen is accurate to 10 À6 second, but such a high accuracy also causes high sensitivity and low robustness. Hence, we round a time value to the nearest decimal fraction with two-digit fractional part. Finally, we drop off the decimal separator to make the value an integer. For example, given a time value of 1.426478, we use 143 as a feature value. Hereafter, we mean the processed value when we say "time value".
Variations
A feature with more variations is more difficult to be guessed by attackers. The variations of our feature is reflected by the distribution of time intervals between each pair of contiguous peak points. To study the variations and correlations of the proposed features, we collected data from finger movements of a single user. Two smartphones (Motorola Droid) are placed side by side on a table. The user placed his index finger on the left smartphone screen and middle finger on the right one. The user did zigzag finger movements on both screens. The data collection took an hour and after each 5-minute usage, the user took a short rest. The user can freely control his finger movement speed. Every time, the user starts from the top of the screen and slide down to the bottom. Sometimes when the user touched the bottom, he slided back without lifting his finger. This is counted as one continuous movement. For all collected data, we remove all the short movements that contain less than five peak points. Fig. 3 shows the histogram of the time intervals in the user's zigzag finger movement on one screen. The top-right sub-plot shows a "zoom-in" histogram of the time intervals between 0 and 50. We note that the bin width is different in the zoom-in histogram. The bin width in the main plot is five units and the one in the subplot is two units. One unit is 0.01 seconds. From the figure, we can see that the time intervals distribute from less than 0.1 second (10 Â 10 À2 ) to around 1.4 seconds. This shows that the variation of a person's feature value is large. We also observed that a large portion of values falls into the interval between 10 and 25. The sub-plot shows that the values distribute almost evenly on each bin between 8 and 24. This shows that this person's finger movement has some pattern: the time that he uses between two peak points is mostly between 0.08 and 0.24 second. 
Correlations
We call a peak point in one sequence and its counterpart in the other a pair. We computed every peak point's elapsed time. Finally, we calculated the absolute difference between the two elapsed time values in each pair. A set of such absolute difference values can be viewed as a measurement of the similarity between the two sensed feature data sets. The distribution of the absolute differences is shown in Fig. 4 . For this testing, we also collected the data from smartphone-tablet combination. The experiments represented by the yellow bars were carried out on two Motorola Droid smartphones, while the experiments represented by the green bars were carried out on two different smart devices-a Motorola Droid smartphone and an HP TouchPad tablet. For comparison purpose, we also calculated the difference sets, as done previously, for another two spatial features, curvature angle and curvature distance, proposed by and defined in [36] . Due to space limitation, we refer readers to [36] for details. We can see that most differences between two corresponding elapsed time values are less than 3, indicating that the two feature data sets are very similar. Specifically, 82.97 percent of all absolute differences obtained from the experiments on the same device type (yellow bars) are less than 3. This percentage is 74.73 percent on the different device types (green bars). At the same time, most absolute differences of another two feature sets are greater than 3 and many of them are greater than 20.
SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
We are now ready to present the construction of our system in details. Our system consists of a conductor and two smart devices. In the following description, one device is denoted by Alice and the other by Bob. We assume that Alice and Bob are able to set up a communication channel through a local network, such as WiFi LAN or bluetooth network. This connection is public and insecure. Our system helps Alice and Bob to authenticate each other in near field and establishes a secure connection by assigning each of them the same session key.
We say the two smart devices are ready, when our NFPA system is launched on both devices and a communication connection has been launched between them. The two devices monitor the screen touch and wait for the conductor's finger movements.
Overview
The proposed system consists of three protocols: system setup and reconciliation, key generation, and key confirmation. The first protocol is to obtain a user's finger movement inputs, i.e., slidings, and removes any differences between the two correlated slidings. The second protocol is to use the same input obtained from the first protocol and generate a session key via a password based key exchange protocol [37] . Finally, the third protocol verifies whether the two generated keys are identical, by asking one party to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted by the other party's key. Given a user's sliding data, the system picks m peak points to perform difference removal and key generation. A larger m will make system succeed with a higher probability but need a longer system execution time. Fig. 5 shows the system setup and feature reconciliation phase. In this phase, we use two hash functions: H 1 : f0; 1g Ã ! G and H 2 : G 2 ! f0; 1g l , where l is determined by the security level. Here G is a multiplicative group of a prime order. Hash function H 2 takes two group elements and outputs an output of fixed length. In practice, H 2 can be constructed from any cryptographic hash function H 0 , which takes an input (of arbitrary length) and hashes to a fixed length output. For example, SHA-1 is such a hash function, if the security level is less than 128 [38] . To construct H 2 , we concatenate the two inputs together and pass into H 0 . Construction of H 1 is special, since it hashes the input to a group G, not a fixed length output. It is constructed from a cryptographic hash function H 00 : f0; 1g Ã ! f0; 1g l 1 , where l 1 ¼ log q and q is the group order. The idea is to hash the input to an element h in Z q and the output of H 1 is g h , where g is a generator of G. However, an output of H 00 may exceed the range of Z q . A standard technique is to re-hash H 00 ðxjj1Þ and verify whether the new output is in Z q . Repeat for k times (H 00 ðxjjkÞ for k-th re-hashing) till the output is accepted. Since the probability that an output exceeds Z q is less than 1/2, the failure probability decreases exponentially with the repeat times. For example, we get an overall failure probability less than 0:1 percent if we choose k ¼ 10.
Construction
Feature reconciliation is to remove differences between Alice's and Bob's sensed data sets. In Fig. 5 , step 1 is just to let Alice pick a subset (of size m) that she wants to reconcile with Bob. Bob picks the requested subset in his own dataset and sends back to Alice an "encrypted" version of the hash of data. The reason for encryption is to hide the data from any one who does not hold a similar data set. Similarly in step 3, Alice "encrypts" the data using her key k but she needs to convince Bob that all the data pieces are encrypted via the same key. She achieves this goal by using zeroknowledge proofs shown in step 3. From step 4 to step 6, Bob peals off his encryption making his subset be only encrypted by Alice's key. Alice extends her subset by including each data's six neighbors and encrypts them under her key. Bob does the set intersection to find out the intersection between his data set and Alice's. Bob then sends back the encrypted intersection (encrypted under Alice's key) and Alice can extract the intersection.
Since the difference between the two values in most pairs is within 3, we let Alice extend her selected set by including a AE 1; a AE 2; a AE 3 for every a in the set (step 5). Then, Alice and Bob privately find the set intersection. We use a private set intersection (PSI) protocol proposed by [7] to let both parties find the same intersection set V b (step 6). Private set intersection here is necessary because Alice's and Bob's raw data sets may be so different that a shared key cannot be derived. A way is needed to obtain the common subset from two different sets, i.e., a set intersection. Also, we want this process to be privacy preserving, because an attacker could use this process as a phishing. The attacker actually does not hold any relevant data sets and just wants to obtain an honest party's data set. If obtaining the data set, the attacker can use it to connect with the other party or to study the conductor's sliding pattern to guess the data set for the next run. Our system needs at least four feature values. Since each feature value is of 6-bit randomness, having more than four feature values means the final key can be randomly guessed with probability less than 2 À24 . If the found set size is too small, we simply let Alice and Bob redo the reconciliation phase. If they still cannot find enough values, this authentication fails and we let the conductor start over the whole authentication again.
In step 3 of the first phase, Alice needs to generate a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof p of knowledge of k s.t. 8 i¼1;...;m z i ¼ ðy i Þ k . Although general zero-knowledge proof systems are currently thought to be inefficient, the zeroknowledge proof system on discrete logarithm has been well studied and there exists an efficient non-interactive proof system [39] . Alice randomly chooses t R Z q and calculates c ¼ When the same intersection set is obtained by both parties, the binary strings of its elements are concatenated together in a string w. Since w may be of low entropy, we propose to use encrypted key exchange approach [37] to leave attackers no choice but doing online dictionary attacks, which are easily captured by honest parties. It is a variation of the original Deffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [40] . The improvement is for defending against MITM attacks, which can break down the original Diffie-Hellman protocol. In the protocol, a session key is the hash of all the previous messages and the secret string K A or K B . In this way, an MITM attack will be effectively defended because two honest parties obtain different messages in an MITM attack. Also, an offline dictionary attack becomes hard because all the intermediate messages are randomized and the final session key is also randomly selected through the hash function. Fig. 7 shows the construction of the key confirmation phase of our NFPA system. Here, we use another hash function H 3 : G 3 ! f0; 1g l . The construction of H 3 is the same as that of H 2 . This phase is to let two parties explicitly confirm that the generated keys are same. We note that a nonce is a random number, the length of which is determined by the security level. For example, if the security level is 80 bit, we will choose a 80-bit random number. In some upper protocols, such as confidential instant message protocols, this phase is not necessary and the confirmation can be done in a implicit way. Bob sends Alice a hello message that is encrypted using his session key. If Alice decrypts the ciphertext and finds the plain text is of no meaning, she will be aware that they must have different session keys. However, this phase becomes necessary for those applications whose goal is solely to perform a near field authentication. 6 SYSTEM ANALYSIS
Performance Analysis
Our NFPA system is a probabilistic algorithm because it is based on the correlations between two human inputs. Due to unpredictable human behaviors, it is possible that the two inputs are different. Our design can remove some small differences, but our system may still fail when most selected data are very different from its counterpart. Given a pair of peak points, if their value difference is no more than 3, we call them a valid pair. We have shown in Section 4.2.2 that it is with high probability to select a valid pair. Particularly, more than 70 percent pairs in our experiments are valid. The failure probability of our system is also affected by the number of the selected elements, m. Generally speaking, the more elements we select, the more probably we can find enough elements.
Theorem 1. The feature reconciliation phase finishes successfully with probability P þ ð1 À P ÞP , where
Here m is the number of total pairs and p is the ratio of valid pairs to total pairs.
Proof. Because the pairs are randomly selected, testing the validity of a selected pair is a Bernoulli trial with success probability p. Therefore, the probability that 4 out of m pairs are valid is
If m ! 7 and the proportion of valid pairs p is more than 70 percent, we obtain the success probability equal to P ¼ 87:40%. If the first attempt fails, the phase lets two parties redo the reconciliation using another set of randomly selected pairs. Therefore, the overall success probability of the feature reconciliation phase is P þ ð1 À P ÞP ¼ 98:4%. t u
Our system is based on a conductor's zigzag finger movement and thus does not need any prior knowledge. The conductor only needs to slide fingers and trigger the authentication process. Therefore, our system is intuitive for people to use and does not need any involved human assistance, such as comparing two strings. Our system is fully decentralized and all computations are done between two devices. It does not need any third trusted center or server.
The feature reconciliation phase performs Oðm log qÞ group multiplications, where q is the group order. The key generation phase needs Oðm log qÞ group multiplications. It is spent on computing M w and N w because the length of w is OðmÞ. The key confirmation is done in constant time.
Security Analysis
Most security threats to an NFPA system come from MITM attacks and dictionary attacks. In the first phase, the private set intersection protocol guarantees that only a set provider can learn the final intersection set and nothing beyond the intersection. In the second phase, if an MITM adversary changes any intermediate message, Alice and Bob will derive different session keys. This alerts both parties to the existence of an adversary. Furthermore, if the adversary does not have the intersection set, he cannot get the keys derived by Alice and Bob.
One may be concerned with replay attacks. If a conductor uses his finger movements to generate the session key for a communication between his and an attacker's smart device, the attacker may use the elapsed time set and carry out an MITM attack when the conductor tries to generate another session key between his smartphone and a third user's. The success of such an attack is based on the assumption that the conductor's finger movements in two sessions are very similar. However, this assumption can be easily broken when the conductor intentionally does not use the same finger movement pattern. For example, the conductor can randomly pause during the motion to break the pattern. Or, we can compare the current elapsed time set against the previous ones and ask the conductor to re-do the authentication and change the pattern if a similarity is found.
Mimicry attack is such an attack in which an attacker observes the conductor's finger movement in some way, such as video, and tries to guess the generated session key. The attacker can imitate the conductor's one side sliding and inject his data set into the protocol flow by impersonating one of the parties and carrying out the protocol with the other honest party. First, this attack has to be taken on the fly, because any off-line dictionary attack will be defended by the password based authentication key exchange protocol (PAKE). Secondly, the attacker has only one chance to carry out the attack, since any more attempt will be noticed by the PAKE protocol. Besides, the elapsed time of the mocked finger movements have to be as precise as 1 milliseconds. In addition, the private set intersection protocol used by our system hides the intersection from an attacker if he does not hold the correlated data set and just sniffs all the communication messages. Due to the private feature of PSI, only the the users who hold the relevant data set will know and only know the intersection. Any third party will be blinded to both intersection and the honest party's inputs. This limitation makes mimicry attacks extremely difficult.
In the traditional private set intersection protocol, an adversary may impersonate one party in the protocol and generate a set of all possible values so that he can infer the honest party's whole input set. However, the feature reconciliation phase restricts the set size, m for Bob and 7m for Alice, to make it difficult for an adversary to enumerate all possible values. Offline dictionary attacks to the key generation phase is also impossible because r; s; M; and N are randomly selected. For an example, R 0 can be viewed as an encryption of message M using key w. Given R 0 ¼ R Á M w , an adversary iterates every possible key w to decrypt the ciphertext. However, since the message M itself is chosen randomly and of no meaning, the adversary cannot verify the validity of the obtained plain text. An adversary can carry out online dictionary attacks, guessing a w and interacting with an honest party. But every failure will be captured by an honest party.
Our system uses two built-in blocks, a private set intersection protocol [7] for feature reconciliation phase (Fig. 5) and an encrypted key exchange protocol [37] for key generation phase (Fig. 6) . The two protocols have been proved to be secure against a malicious adversary in random oracle model by [37] and [7] , respectively. The random oracle model is a security proving framework that assumes the existence of a random oracle mapping each request value to a random value. This oracle can be accessed by all protocol participants, including the adversary. The hash function is usually modeled as the random oracle in the proof. Following the same idea, we will see that the feature reconciliation phase and key generation phase of our system are secure. One thing we need to point out is step 6, where we connect the two built-in blocks. Different from the protocol in [7] , we let Bob send back the hash values of the intersection set. If Bob is impersonated by an adversary, our system gives him a chance to maliciously change the returned values such that Alice will obtain an intersection set different from her own one. We remark that the adversary cannot arbitrarily manipulate the set intersection in the sense that he can only remove elements or add new elements that he does not know (chosen from Alice's published hash values). While this breaks the fairness in private set intersection protocols, we argue that it does not harm our system. This is because the intersection set itself is of no interest to the adversary, whose goal is to get the final session key and the follow up communication contents. If the adversary modifies the intersection set, he will obtain a session key different from Alice's. Alice will then abort in the key confirmation phase. Therefore, an adversary has no incentive to do such a modification.
EVALUATION
A proof-of-concept prototype of our system has been implemented on a low-end device-Motorola Droid smarpthone with Android 2.2 OS. The smartphone has a 550 MHz ARM A8 processor, 256 MB memory, and a 16 GB SD card.
We first tested whether our feature reconciliation can finish successfully with a high probability. We invited 20 people to be users of our system and asked them to conduct ZigZag finger movements on two smartphones. Each user slides his finger from the top of screen to the bottom and is asked to conduct at least 10 peak points for a continuous sliding. Each user is asked to make 10 slidings and he can freely control his sliding speed or direction. When data is collected, we calculated whether the feature reconciliation of a sliding succeeds or not for a given m. Given a user and an m, we calculated the ratio of successful reconciliations to the total number of reconciliations. Hence, for each m, we have 20 success ratios. The statistics of these ratios are depicted by a box plot in Fig. 9 . In a box plot, the middle bar, the top of the box, and the bottom of the box represent 50, 75, and 25 percent quantile of the data set. From the figure, we can see that even if m is only 5, the median of the success rate is close to 80 percent, and some users can achieve 90 percent success rate. When m is increased to 7, the median of the success ratios is around 90 percent. When m is higher than 7, the median stays above 90 percent and more ratios comes above 90 percent, which is reflected by the fact that the bottom of the boxes climes high.
Sliding time is an important factor which we need to pay attention to. It affects system execution time. Given a user, we calculated how much time, in unit of 0.01 seconds, he used to slide from one peak point to the next. In this way, we obtained a data set for each user and depict it by an error bar in Fig. 10 . The middle point of an error bar is the mean of the data set; the northbound and southbound lines of an error bar represent the standard deviation of the data set. It is clear that the largest median is about 35 units (0.35 seconds) and the smallest one is 15 units. Therefore, a user needs approximately 3.5 seconds to finish a sliding if the desired peak point number is 10.
Our system is easy to be adopted by all test participants. During our experiment, all users can catch the idea after our 5-min introduction and know how to slide on the two screens, while all the users are high educated and familiar with smartphone usage. All the failed authentications were due to the failure of feature reconciliation rather than misoperations. We have not observed any failure that is caused by user's operations.
One concern about our system is whether mimicry attacks are possible. In a mimicry attack, an attacker observes a user's sliding, mimics the sliding, and carries out an MITM attack to establish a secure channel between his device and the user's by matching his mimicry sliding with the user's sliding. To rule out this concern, we designed an experiment to show how difficult to launch a mimicry attack. We invited 10 users and four attackers. For each user, the attackers sit in his front, back, left, and right sides and observe the user's slidings on two smartphones. After the user slides, each attacker is asked to give his mimicry sliding on two smartphones. We compared the attacker's right (resp. left) sliding to the user's left (resp. right) sliding by using the difference (absolute value) between elapsed time periods of two counterparts as a criteria. We aggregated these differences for 10 users per attack direction and show them in a box plot of Fig. 12 , where y-axis is time unit, 0.01 seconds. At the same time, we show users' self differences (between his left sliding and right one) at the last box plot. The red dotted line in the figure is unit 3 line. In our proximity authentication, a difference should be smaller than 3 to be recognized as valid, i.e., lower than dotted line in the figure. It is clear that the mimic sliding is much different than the original correlated sliding, since most mimic sliding's differences are above 25 units. In the mean time, the self difference are around 3 unit. Another observation is that attacks at different directions are not as different as we thought. While over-shoulderpeeking attack (back in Fig. 12 ) performs best, the advantage is not overwhelming. Besides, the sliding used in our system is one time. Users can (and is recommended to) change their sliding patterns, e.g. randomly paused during a sliding, making mimicry attacks more difficult to succeed.
In the feature reconciliation phase, we use a hash-intogroup hash function H 1 , which is constructed from a cryptographic hash function as introduced in Section 5. The construction is a probabilistic algorithm. We tested the success rate of this hash function. For test purpose, we hashed 1,000 random numbers, from ð0; 200, into four different order groups: 128, 160, 512, and 1,024 bit groups. The first two group orders are popular selection for the elliptic curve groups (ECC) and the last two are for the quadratic residue groups over the Galois field modulo a safe prime, which is called DL groups in this section. 160-bit and 512-bit output were obtained by using SHA-1 and SHA-512. In order to obtain a 128-bit output, we used SHA-1 and took the 128 least significant bits as output. To obtain 1,024-bit output, we divided the binary string of the input number into two halves, hashed each half into a 512-bit string, and concatenated the both together. For each number, we recorded how many attempts needed to hash the number into the desired group. Each experiment tried 10 re-hashes before it reported "fail". Fig. 11 shows the results. We observe that, in our experiments, to hash a number into the 128-bit, 512-bit, and 1,024-bit groups, we needed to try no more than four times. For the 160-bit group, we needed to re-hash a small portion of numbers for more than five times. We note that, in our experiments, all 1,000 random numbers were successfully hashed into the groups in 10 attempts.
For a smartphone protocol, the execution time is critical in the sense that smartphones usually have limited computational and storage resources. As pointed out previously, all our experiments were carried out on a low-end Motorola Droid smartphone. We tested the running time of the zeroknowledge proof generating and verifying, the feature reconciliation phase, and the key generation phase. We did not test the key confirmation phase since it does not take up much proportion in the system execution time and actually always costs the same time when the security parameter is determined. Our system was implemented in two types of groups: a 1,024-bit quadratic residue subgroup of a Galois field modulo a safe prime p and a 160-bit elliptic curve group. According to NIST's guidance [41] , the two groups both have 80-bit security level. The results are shown in Figs. 8a, 8b, and 8c. We remark that the time of the feature reconciliation phase contains the time of generating and verifying zero knowledge proof. We note that the y-axis in the figures are not continuous and we skipped in the middle because there was a big gap between the execution time of the two implementations. To show the details of the time change in the plots, we stretched the y-axis and cut off the middle blank area. We executed the two implementations under different m values introduced in step 1. All the execution time increased linearly with the increase of m, since we have to process larger sets in generating the proof and performing private set intersection. A larger set also leads to higher probability of generating a long password w, which causes more execution time in generating the session key. Another obvious observation is that the ECC implementation was overwhelmingly faster than the DL implementation in zero knowledge proof, feature reconciliation, and key generation. For an example, if we set m ¼ 18, the DL implementation took almost 100 seconds to privately find a set intersection, while the ECC implementation needed less than 7 seconds. The same performance difference was also observed when we perform zero knowledge proof and key generation. The difference is due to the different group sizes used by the two implementations: the DL implementation used a 1,024-bit group and the ECC implementation used a 160-bit group. The reason for the different order choice is that the security of a DL group is easier to be cracked when its order is the same as an ECC group. For a larger group size, a basic group operation, such as multiplication and exponentiation, costs more time. Therefore, it is not surprising to see such a big gap between the two execution time values. We thus recommend to use ECC group as the real implementation of our NFPA system. In practice, m ¼ 10 is sufficiently large to select four pairs of valid peak points. In this case, the ECC implementation took 3.71 and 0.14 seconds to finish first phase and the second phase. Totally, the system can terminate in less than 4 seconds for an authentication.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new concept, named near field proximity authentication, to help smart devices authenticate each other in a near field. We have designed a near field proximity authentication system which uses a novel and natural human motion, zigzag finger movement, to enforce the spatial closeness. We have shown that the finger movement have high variations and stable similarities. In order to remove the differences between sensed feature data and generate high-entropy session key, we have proposed to use private set intersection and encrypted key exchange in our system. Finally, we have implemented our system on a real Android smartphone with a bland hardware specification and demonstrated its efficiency. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
